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An Act of the Legislature provided for an election to adopt or reject a proposed high license law, and enacted that "if a majority of the voters shall
determine in favor of," etc. At the election, the number of votes cast in
favor of the high license law was not equal to the number of those cast for
members of Congress, but the votes cast in favor of the law constituted a
majority of all the votes polled on that subject: Held, the adoption of the
act did not depend upon its receiving a majority of all the votes cast at that
election upon some other subject, but upon its receiving a majority of the
votes cast specifically for or against it; and that the act was therefore adopted.
All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called are
presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting.
AppEAL

from the Circuit Court for Washington County.

George Schley and Edward Stake, for appellant.
X. L. Keedy and F. . McComas, for appellee.
MCSHERY, J.
By an act of the General Assembly of
Maryland, passed at the January Session of 1886, chapter
248, after making provision s to the mode of procuring and
the price to be paid for a license, authorizing the sale of
spirituous, fermented, and intoxicating liquors in Washington
County, it is enacted as follows :"Sec. 7. And be it enacted: That upon the first Tuesday
after the first Monday of November, 1886, the voters of said
county, at the general election then to be held, shall determine
by ballot whether or not the provisions of this act shall go
into effect in said county; those favoring the act will cast
their ballots with the words written or printed thereon, 'For
the High License Law,' and those opposing the act will cast
their ballots with the words written or printed thereon,
'Against the High License Law;' and it shall be the duty of
the judges of the said election to make a full return of the
ballots cast as aforesaid, as now provided by law, to the clerk
of the Circuit Court for Washington County, who, upon the
certified returns, shall immediately make proclamation as to
the result of said election."
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"See. 8. And be it enacted: That if a majority of the
voters of said county shall determine by their ballots in favor
of the 'High License Law,' and the clerk of said court shall
so proclamate to the people of said County, the provisions of
this act shall take effect on the first day of May, 1887."
At the general election, which was held on the second day
of NTovember, 1886, in Washington County, the aggregate
number of votes cast for the several candidates for Congress
was eight thousand six hundred and eighty. The number of
votes cast "for the High License Law" was four thousand
three hundred and fourteen, and the number "against the
High License Law" was three thousand eight hundred and
twenty-five. On the fifth day of November the clerk of the
Circuit Court for that county issued his proclamation, setting
forth the number of votes cast both for and against the High
License Law, and certifying and declaring "that it appears
from said returns, now in file in my office, that upon said
question a majority of the voters of said county have determined by their ballots in favor of the High License Law."
On the second day of May following, the appellant, a dealer
in spirituous, fermented, and intoxicating liquors, in the
county named, applied to the clerk of the Circuit Court for a
license authorizing him to sell such liquors, and tendered to
the clerk in payment for the license the amount fixed by the
general license law of the State, which amount was less than
that prescribed by the act now under consideration. The
clerk refused to issue the license to the appellant unless he
would pay the gum named in the act now in question, and
would also comply with the other provisions thereof. Upon
such refusal the appellant filed, in the Circuit Court for
Washington county, a petition charging that "in truth, and
in fact, a majority of the voters of said county at said election
have not determined by their ballots in favor of the High
License Law, and that said clerk has not correctly and truly
proclamated the result of said election in accordance with the
requirements of said Act of Assembly ;" and praying for a
writ of mandamus against the appellee, the clerk of the court,
requiring him to issue to the appellant the license previously
applied for, without a compliance on the part of the appellant
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with any of the provisions of the act now before us. The
appellee answered this petition, and a statement was filed
showing the number of votes cast at said general election
upoh this measure, and for the congressional candidates; and
a pro forma order was passed refusing the writ. From that
order this appeal has been taken.
It thus appears, and in fact it is conceded, that the number
of votes cast in favor of the High License Law was not equal
to the majority of all the votes cast at the same election for
the several candidates for Congress; though the votes actually
cast in favor of this law constituted a majority of all the votes
polled on that particular subject. The single question, there.
fore, presented by this appeal is, whether, under these circumstances, the act became operative and effective; or, stated
in other words, did the adoption of the act depend upon its
receiving in its favor a majority of all the votes cast at that
election upon some other subject or subjects; or upon its receiving a majority of the votes cast specifically for and against
its adoption?
It has been settled, both in England and in this country, by
an almost, if not quite, unbroken current of judicial decisions
from the time of Lord MANSFIELD to the present day, that
when an election is held at which a subject-matter is to be
determined by a majority of voters entitled to cast ballots
thereat, those absenting themselves and those who, being
present, abstained from voting, are considered as acquiescing
in the result declared by the majority of those actually voting; even though, in point of fact, but a minority of those
entitled to vote really do vote. Thus, in Oldknow v. Wainwright, 2 Burr. 1017, which was a feigned action to try a
right of election to the office of town clerk of Nottingham,
the fourth issue was whether Thomas Lengrave was duly
elected by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council; and
there was a special verdict, wherein after setting out the constitution of the borough, that the voices were all equal
voices, the vacancy of office of town clerk and a regular summons to elect another, it proceeded as follows: "That the
whole number of electors was twenty-five, and that out of
that number, twenty-one assembled on the twenty-sixth of
VOL. XXXVI.-66
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May pursuant to the said summons; that the Mayor put

Thomas Lengrave in nomination, and that no other person
was put in nomination; that nine of the twenty-one voted for
him, but twelve of them did not vote at all, but eleven of
them protested against any election at that time," etc. Lord
MANSFIELD held, "whenever electors are present and don't
vote at all (as they have done here), they virtually acquiesce
in the election made by those who do." Judge FOLGER in
People ex rel. Furman v. Glute, 50 N. Y. 461, delivering the
opinion of the court, says: " It is also the theory and practice
of our government that a minority of the whole body of qualified electors may elect to an office when a majority of that
body refuse or decline to vote for any one for that office.
Those of them who are absent from the polls in theory and
practical results, are assumed to assent to the action of those
who go to the polls, and those who go to the polls and do not
vote for any candidate for office, are bound by the result of
the action of those who do," etc.
Conceding this to be true with respect to a special election
held for the purpose of submitting a single question to the
popular vote, it is insisted on the part of the appellant that a
different principle should prevail in a case like this, where,
at a general election, the measure, though receiving a majority
of the votes cast on that subject, failed to receive a majority
of the votes cast upon some other subject. Hence, as we have
already stated, the sole ground upon which it is claimed that
the act in question failed to become effective is, that at the
general election, when the subject was voted on, less than a
majority of those who voted for the congressional candidates
cast their ballots "For High License Law," and not that a
majority of those who voted on this subject did not vote in
favor of it. This objection to the adoption of the act is
founded exclusively upon the construction which is sought to
be placed upon the words of the eighth section, "a majority
of the voters of said county," taken in connection with the
evidence furnished by the vote in the congressional canvass,
that there were more voters in the county than the number
who voted upon this measure. If this construction, which
confines the language to what is alleged to be its literal im-
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port without reference to the provisions of the preceding section, is to prevail, it would be, it seems to us, as applicable
in the case of a special election, where but one subject is submitted, as it is claimed that it is in the ease of a gereral
election, where several subjects or persons are to be be voted
for, the only difference between the two instances being in
respect to the evidence which may be adduced to ascertain
the actual number of voters of the county. In regard to a
general election, it is urged that the highest aggregate vote
cast furnishes the evidence as to the number of the voters of
the county. At a special election it is not improbable that
only a minority of the voters, well known to be an unmistakable minority, may vote. This fact might be susceptible of
proof-might be, in reality, self-evident. Yet in the latter
instance those who absent themselves from the polls, and
those who, being present, abstain from voting, are regarded
as assenting to the result declared by those who do vote.
Upon what principle would it be incompetent to apply the
same presumption to those who, though attending a general
election and voting on other subjects, abstain from voting
upon one particular matter like the act in question? The
very concession that a minority may elect necessarily implies
that there is a larger number of voters who do not vote, of
whom that minority is merely a fraction. Hence, the admission that a majority of those entitled to vote did not vote
does not preclude the minority who actually do vote from determining the result by their ballots. That is precisely what
was decided in Oldknow v. Wainwright, where there were
twenty-five entitled to vote, of whom twenty-one were present
and only nine voted, and eleven protested against an election.
The special verdict shows how many voters there were, how
many were present, and that only a minority voted; and yet
it was held that the election by that minority was perfectly
valid.
Recurring to the language of the act, it will be observed

that the Legislature has with particularity provided the formsof the ballots, both for and against the High License Law; and
that it has prescribed that "a full return of the ballots cast as
aforesaid"-that is, cast for and against the act-should be
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made by the judges of election to the clerk, and that the latter, "upon the certified returns, shall immediately make proclamation as to the result of said election." What possible
reason was there for the Legislature making provision with
such exactness for "a full return of the ballots cast," both for
and against the High License Law, and for a proclamation
by the clerk upon the certified returns, if it was not designed
that exclusive reference to the votes cast on that subject
should be had in determining whether the act did or did not
become operative? It is perfectly manifest that the phrase,
"full returns of the ballots cast as aforesaid," refers to the
votes cast for and against the High License Law and to no
other votes, and that the duty of the clerk to "make proclamation as to the result of said election" could only be performed by announcing the result as evidenced by the certified
returns of the votes cast upon that subject. If, therefore, he
was confined in making his proclamation as to the result of
the election to the returns made to him of the votes cast for
and against the adoption of this act, no votes cast at the same
election for some other purpose can be considered, counted or
resorted to in determining the question of the approval of this
measure. Indeed, if the Legislature intended that the act
should not become effective unless a majority of all the voters
of the county affirmatively voted for it, it is difficult to conjecture a reason for the insertion of the provision respecting
the casting and counting of votes against the measure, because, upon the assumption that the construction contended
for is correct, if the votes cast in favor of the act had not been
equal to a majority of all the voters voting for some candidate, or for some other measure at that election, the act
would have failed to take effect, notwithstanding no votes
had been cast against it at all, and consequently it would
have been wholly unnecessary to make any provision whatever for casting ballots against the adoption of the law. The
proclamation which the clerk is directed to make, is "as to
the result of said election ;" that is, the election held upon
this question. The eighth section of the act must be read in
conjunction with the seventh section, which we have been
considering; and thus read, clearly means not a majority of
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all the voters of the county voting on some other subject, but
a majority of all the voters of the county who vote upon this
act., The contrary construction would place these two sections in antagonism, and would cause the eighth to render
nugatory the provisions of the seventh section.
The conclusion which we have reached is fully supported
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Saint Joseph
Township v. Bogers, 16 Wall. 644, where the language, "a
majority of the legal voters of the township" was held to
"require only a majority of the legal voters of the township
voting at the election," etc. ; and by the same court in the
County of Cass v. Johnston, 5 Otto, 360. In this last-named
case all the cases relied upon by the appellant are reviewed,
and the majority of the court, through Chief Justice WAITE,
states the question there presented as follows: "The first
question presented for our determination in this case is
whether the Township Aid Act of Missouri is repugnant to
Art. XI., sec. 14, of the Constitution of that State, inasmuch
as it authorizes subscriptions by townships to the capital stock
of railroad companies wherever two-thirds of the qualified
voters of the township, voting at an election called for that
purpose, shall vote in favor of the subscription, while the
Constitution prohibits such subscription, unless two-thirds of
the qualified voters of the town, at a regular or special election,
to be held therein, shall assent thereto." The court quotes
with approval the construction placed by the same tribunal
in 16 Wall. upon the clause, "a majority of the legal voters
of a township," and adds, "This we understand to be the
established rule, as the effect of elections in the absence of any
statutory regulations to the contrary. All qualified voters
who absent themselves from an election, duly called, are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those
voting, unless the law providing for the election otherwise
declares. Any other rule would be productive of the greatest
inconvenience, and ought not to be adopted unless the legislative will to that effect is clearly expressed." Other cases to
the same effect might be cited, but it is not deemed necessary
to do so.
Being of the opinion, for the reason assigned and upon the
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authorities quoted, that the two sections construed together
clearly mean that the. act was to become operative and effective if it received as it did, at the general election referred to,
the approval of a majority of the voters of the county voting
on that subject, we will affirm the order appealed from.
Order affirmed.
The question involved in this case
is one of great interest and importance. Upon first reading the case, it
seemed to us that the point at issue
was correctly decided; but further
consideration and the study of the
adjudged cases upon the subject
other than those cited in the opinion,
have convinced us that the case is at
variance with the clear weight of
authority.
The only cases cited by the court
are Oldknow v. Wainwright, 2 Burr,
1017, also cited as Rex v. Foxcrofl;
Furman v. (Jute, 50 N. Y. 461 ; St.
Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall.
644; and Cass v. Johnston, 5 Otto,
360.
The principle of the case of Rex v.
Foxcroft has been reaffirmed in nearly
every subsequent case, upon both
sides of this question; and is not
questioned by any of the authorities.
Furman v. Clute, so far as it affects
this question, is a mere dictum. The
point actually decided in that case
was that where a majority of the
electors through ignorance of the law
or of the fact, vote for one ineligible
to an office, the votes are not nullities ;
while they fail to elect, the office
cannot be given to the qualified person having the next highest number
of votes; the election is a failure and
a new election must be had.
In the case of St. Joseph Township
v. Rogers, the election in question was
a special election to authorize the
issue of certain *township bonds in
aid of a railroad, at which a majority

of the legal voters voting at the election voted in favor of the proposition.
The question involved in the principal case did not therefore arise; but
the principle of Rex v. Foxcroft was
very properly applied.
The case of County of Cass v. Johnston was also a special election to
authorize the issue of railroad aid
bonds, and the remarks made above
with reference to the case of St. Joseph
Township v. Rogers are equally applicable to this case.
None of the cases cited by the court
appear to be authoritative upon the
exact question in issue. The case of
Gillespie v. Palmer, 20Wisc. 544, is the
only case we have been able to find
which comes fairly up to the point of
supporting the doctrine of the principalcase, andinthis case, the argument
of the court was largely based upon
the use of the word "votes," instead
of "voters."
In Gillespie v. Palmer
the question arose under the following
clause of the State Constitution:
"'Provided, that the Legislature may
at any time extend by law the right
of suffrage to persons not herein
enumerated; but no such law shall
be in force until the same shall have
been submitted to a vote of the people at a general election, and approved by a majority of all the votes
cast at such election." The court
held that the act in question became
a law when approved by a majority
of all the votes on that subject cast
at such election, though less than a
majority of all the votes on all sub-
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Jects and for all officers, cast at such election voted in favor of the proelection, or than a majority of all the position. State v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo.
voters voting at such election.
270. In Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v.
As already stated, the doctrine of
Davidson Co., 1 Smeed, 690, the rule
Rex v. Foxcroft may be regarded as in Rex v. Foxcroft was properly apwell settled in this country. The proved.
The case of Augustin v.
following cases, which are often cited Eggleston, 12 La. Ann. 366, does not
upon questions of this sort, may be discuss this question at length, but
briefly stated in this connection : In simply states that elections are to be
the State v. Binder,38 Mo. 450, which determined by the majority of the
was the case of a special election, the ballots cast, and are not to be set
court lay down the undisputed rule aside on account of the meagreness
that it is to be presumed, in the ab- of the vote in that district and cirsence of any evidence to the contrary,
cumstantial allegations of error,
that the voters voting at an election fraud, violence, or illegality affecting
held in pursuance of law and upon the result.
proper notice, are all the legal voters ;
Having cited the one case tending
or that those who did not choose to to support the principal case and
vote, if there are any, acquiesce in several following the rule of Rex v.
the action of those who do vote, and
Foxcroft, we come now to several
are to be considered as bound and cases which are more or less opposed
concluded by the result of the elec- to the doctrine of the principal case :
tion. To the same effect, see State In the case of the County-seat of Linn
v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270 (which also County, 15 Kan. 500, 530, the court
was a case concerning a special elec- lays down the rule that should
tion). In People v. Warfidd, 20 Ill. govern questions of this sort, very
159, it was held, that a majority of
carefully, as follows: "It seems to
the legal votes cast at an election for us, therefore, that where the Legisa re-location of a county-seat, under lature has provided an election as the
a constitutional provision, requiring means of ascertaining the wishes of
that a majority of the voters of the the electors in reference to a change
county shall vote for the change, was of the county-seat, and has made no
sufficient to determine the question. provision for a registration, and has
In this case, 1440 votes were polled, designated no other list or roll as the
of which Harrisburg received 725;
evidence of the number of electors, it
Raleigh 689, and twenty-six persons may, when the constitutional provoting at said election did not vote vision quoted (requiring the consent
for either place. In Reiger v. Town of a majority of the electors of the
of Beaufort, 70 N. C. 319, the election county) declare that the place rewas special, and the rule of Rex v. ceiving the majority of the votes cast,
Foxcroft was properly applied. The shall be the county-seat. As these
words of the statute in this case, county-seat elections cannot be held
moreover, tended to support this on the days of general elections,
view. Where a proposition to issue these considerations do not apply to
bonds was required to be authorized cases where two or more questions
by a two-thirds vote of the qualified are permitted at the same election,
and more votes are cast upon one
electors of a city at a special election,
it was held sufficient if two-thirds of
question than upon another, for then
the qualified voters who voted at such the highest number of votes cast
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upon any one question is clear evidence of the number of voters, which
may not, in view of any such constitutional restriction as above quoted,
be disregarded in any contest arising
as to the decision of the other questions. Nor, perhaps, do they apply
to cases where two elections are held
so near together in time that the
courts may fairly say that the difference between the number of votes
cast upon the two elections can not
reasonably be accounted for upon the
theory of a change in the number of
electors."
In People v. Brown, 11
Ill. 478, the words of the Constitution
referring to township organization
were, "whenever a majority of the
voters of such county at any general
election, shall so determine." The
title of the statute contained the
same words; but in the body of the
act the words were, "a majority of
all the votes cast for or against township organizations." The court held
that an affirmative vote of a majority
of all the citizens of the county entitled to vote was requisite, and that
a majority of those voting when less
than a majority of all in the county
was insufficient. In the People v.
Wiant, 48 I1. 263, the question again
came before the Supreme Court upon
an election for the removal of a
county-seat; and it was held, that
where an election on the question of
the removal of a county-seat happens
to be held at the same time of another election, as for circuit judge,
the vote cast on the single question
.of removal will not alone govern as
to whether a majority of all the legal
voters of the county were given in
favor of removal, but it must appear
that a majority of all the votes given
at that election were so given. State
v. W1inkelmeier, 35 Mo. 103, is quite
similar in its facts and in results to
the case of People v. 117ant. In the

State v. Lancaster Co., 6 Neb. 474, it
was held that to adopt township
organization, required a majority of
all the legal voters of the county,
voting at the general election at
which the question was submitted.
The constitutional provision in question required "a majority of all the
legal voters of the county, voting on
the question." It appeared that 2451
legal voters of the county voted at that
general election ; that 952 votes were
cast in favor of township organization,
and 601 voted against it. It was held
that 1226 votes were requisite.
In State v. Sutterfield, 54 Mo. 391,
the question arose under Art. 14, § 5,
of the State Constitution of Missouri,
which prohibited the removal of a
county-seat unless "two-thirds of the
qualified voters shall vote in favor of
such removal."
The Constitution
also provided for the registration of
voters, and the statute upon the subject (Wag. St. 405,
22) required a
two-thirds vote of the "legally registered voters" to warrant the transfer.
Held, that two-thirds of the votes
cast at an election on the question of
removal would be insufficient under
the law to authorize the change, unless they numbered two-thirds of all
the qualified voters of the county.
In Chester, etc., R. R. Co. v. Caldwell
Co., 72 N. C. 486, the words of the
Constitution relative to contracting of
debts by municipal corporations were,
"unless by a vote of a *majority of
the qualified voters therein." The
Constitution in another section of the
same article also directed the General
Assembly to provide for the registration of voters, which the statute"
passed in accordance therewith provided for, just before each general
election. Under these circumstances
it was held such registration was the
means intended to afford the number
of qualified voters in the county.
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Reiger v. Town of Beaufort was distinguished in that the bonds in that
case were in the hands of an innocent
holder. Hawkins v. Carroll Co., 50
Miss. 736, is quite similar to Chester,
etc., B. R. Co. v. Caldwell Co., and
the same rule was there laid down.
In Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107,
the question involved was the validity
of the removal of a county-seat, and
the constitutional provision required
the question to be submitted to the
electors of the county at a general
election and be adopted by a majority
of such electors. The plaintiff claimed
that this clause required an absolute
majority of those qualified to vote in
the county at the time of the election,
but the court considered that since
the returns of the officers showed the
actual number present at such election voting on any question, those present and voting at such election constituted the electors of the county.
The court in this case cite Louisville,
etc., R. R. Co. v. Davidson Co., 1
Smeed, 690, and People v. Warfield,
supra, as authority for their decision.
In Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249,
which was also a county-seat case,
the case of Taylor v. Taylor was explained and approved.
A careful reading of these cases
convinces us that the rule of Rex v.
Foxcroft is applicable only when there
is no other legal evidence before the
court of the whole number of electors
in the voting district than the ballots
themselves cast to decide the question
at issue. In such case the court will
not enter upon an inquiry as to the
number of electors in the voting district, but will regard the ballots as
conclusive evidence thereof.
But
where evidence such as is furnished
by the ballots at a general election is
at hand, or where a registry is required in order to qualify one to vote,
and the statute uses such terms as
VoL. XXXVI.-67

"qualified" voters, then a different
rule prevails, and a majority of the
votes cast upon the particular question will not suffice, unless the statute
expressly or by necessary implication
so states. Eliminating section 7 of
the Maryland statute from the case
there can, as it seems to us, be no escape from this conclusion; and the
claim of the appellant that a different
principle should prevail and that the
proposition voted upon is not carried
in a case where, at a general election,
the measure, though receiving a majority of the votes cast on that subject, fails to receive a majority of the
whole number of voters voting at
that election, must be conceded to*be
correct.
As to the effect of section 7 of the
Maryland statute upon the question,
we confess that the argument of the
court has much weight. It is, however, a principle of law that all existing statutes upon the same subject
matter shall be considered in determining the construction to be given one
of them. We are not familiar with
the general election laws of Maryland, and have not at hand the means
of determining whether the clause
"upon the certified returns" may not
refer to the returns generally of the
judges of elections in the county.
Standing alone the clause would seem
to refer to the returns previously referred to, though in such case one of
the words "such," "said," or "aforesaid" would have rendered the meaning more apparent. We have therefore confined our attention to the
other branch of the case, and have
no hesitation in expressing the opinion that so far as it may be considered
as an authority adverse to the general position above taken and discussed, it seeks contrary to the weight
of authority.
M. D. EWELL.
Chicago, May 28, 1888.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
SHIRK v. SHULTZ.
Where an infant partner goes into a court of equity and asks for the appointment of a receiver, he thereby consents that the ultimate rights of all
parties shall be settled by the court, according to law and equity, and where
he asks the court to take charge of goods purchased by the firm, as part of its
assets, he cannot also disaffirm the contract of purchase so as to escape liability therefor, and, at the same time, retain them; and the court will, in
such case, treat them as partnership assets, and apply them first to the payment of the firm debts.

from Circuit Court, Decatur County.
The appellant, Milton H. Shirk, an infant, by his next
friend, brought suit for the appointment of a receiver to take
charge of the assets of the firm in which he was a partner,
and for the recovery out of said assets of the amount invested
by him therein.
APPEAL

.Ewing Ewing, for appellants.
Miller .Gavin, for appellee.
'

The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZOLLARS, J.

Appellant alleges in his complaint that in October, 1884,
when he was a minor, he entered into partnership with appellee for an indefinite time, in the business of upholstering and
dealing in furniture, under the firm name of Shirk & Shultz;
that he still is a minor; that he invested in the business,
$500; that the firm has on hand furniture and goods of the
value of $850, and is in debt over $600, that "he is advised
by his guardian to renounce such partnership, and withdraw
from the said firm; and he hereby renounces such arrangement, and asks to avoid, annul, and undo all of his obligations in that behalf ;" that Shultz is insolvent, and that the
filrm creditors will exhaust the assets of the firm unless a
receiver shall be appointed to take charge of them, etc. The
prayer is for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the assets of the firm and convert them into money, and pay,
first, to appellant the amount invested by him, and, seco:,id,
the firm debts. The court made a special finding of facts, in
substance, that in October, 1884, Shirk & Shultz entered into
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partnership, and continued in business until the commencement of this action, in August, 1885. Shirk is a minor and
has a guardian. He entered into a partnership, and put into
the business $271.40, with the consent of his guardian. Of
that amount, $74.50 was paid to Shultz, to be used in the
purchase of goods for the firm, and it was so used. The balance of the $271.40 was paid by Shirk on the debts of the
firm, for goods, and labor of employ~s. During the existence
of the firm, Shirk drew out $100. Shultz put into the business $260, and drew out nothing. The assets of the firm, at
the time this suit was commenced, amounted in value to
$800, and its debts aggregated $700. Shultz is insolvent.
Upon the facts so found, the court below concluded, as a matter of law, that the firm should be dissolved, and that a receiver should be appointed to take charge of the firm assets,
convert them into money, and pay, first, the costs of this
suit; second, the firm debts and, third, divide the surplus, if
any, between the partners. A receiver was accordingly appointed. Appellant excepted to the conclusions of law, and
contended, and still contends, that, upon the facts found by
the court, he is entitled to have refunded to him, from the
assets of the firm, the amount which he invested, in preference to the partnership creditors and all others. Whether
or not he is so entitled, is the one question for decision.
The facts in the case of Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182,
were these: Dunton, a minor, entered into partnership with
Brown, and put about $100 into the business. After the
business had been continued for about three months, Dunton
informed Brown that he would no longer continue as a partner, and that if he remained any longer, he must be paid for
his services. To that, Brown would not consent. Dunton
went away for a while, but subsequently returned, and continued for nine months. After leaving again, he brought an
action to recover back the $100 with interest, and for his
services. It was held that he could not maintain the action.
In speaking of the partnership agreement, it was said: "It
is at best only voidable; and we have found no authority
which enables the infant or his guardian to determine whether
a voidable contract shall be affirmed or annulled while the
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intancy continues. It appears to be a mutter for his own
decision when he arrives at mature age. * * * And it is
worthy of consideration whether, inasmuch as the partnership business continued and ended before suit, and before
majority, it does not come within the rule which protects
executed contracts in many cases. Squire v. Hydiff, 9 Mich.
274. Without deciding what may happen when the infant
reaches majority, we think it impossible to sustain an implied
assumpsit, now, against the terms of the only agreement ever
made, which was certainly not a nullity."
In the case of Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344, one partner
brought a suit for the dissolution of the firm, and the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the firm assets, and
pay the firm debts, etc. In bar of the suit, the other partner
interposed the plea of his infancy. In the decision of the
case, after citing and approving the Michigan case above and
the case of Armitage v. Widoe, 86 Mich. 130, which followed
it, the court said: "Having formed this partnership, he cannot so far repudiate it during his minority as to escape such
consequences of partnership as do not involve personal liability for claims against the firm, or costs incident to the
legal settlement of its affairs. Such partnership must be
dissolved as any other; and the partnership assets must be
assignable to partnership creditors. What his rights may
be as against his adult co-partner, when he reaches majoritywe
do not decide."
The case of Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107, frequently cited
by text writers, was this: Kitchen and Lee were partners.
During the existence of the partnership they contracted debts
as partners. Kitchen retired from the business, and relinquished to Lee the goods of the firm, upon the condition that
he would pay, or procure to be paid, the debts then due from
the firm, and indemnify him, Kitchen, against the same. Previous to the retirement of Kitchen from the firm, Lee represented to him that he was twenty-one years of age. Subsequent
to the dissolution of the firm, Lee refused to pay the firm
debts, upon the ground that he was a minor, and not legally
liable to pay such debts; and made a pretended sale of the
goods to Price, who paid no consideration, and took them
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with knowledge of the facts that the firm debts were not
paid, and that the sale to him was fraudulent as against
Kitchen. Stating the above facts in his bill, Kitchen prayed
for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the goods
and apply them to the payment of the partnership debts.
To the bill Lee pleaded that at the time of making the agreement to pay the firm debts he was a minor, and that Kitchen
had notice of that fact. WALWORvT, chancellor, held that the
contract on the part of Lee to pay the debts was one which
he might affirm or repudiate, at his election: but that he
could not be permitted to retain all the partnership effects,
and at the same time refuse to perform the condition upon
which Kitchen's interest in the effects of the firm was to become his property; that if Lee elected to rescind the agreement made, upon the retiring of Kitchen from the business,
the latter had a right to insist that his interest in the copartnership effects should be applied to the payment of the debts
in the same manner as if the dissolution had not taken place.
It was further said: "The rule of law on the subject is that
an infant cannot be permitted to retain the property purchased
by him, and at the same time repudiate the contract upon
which he received it. * * * If the goods in this case had belonged to the complainant (Kitchen) exclusively, at the time
of the agreement, and the infant had repudiated his agreement
when he became of age, trover or replevin would have been
the proper remedy for the goods, if they remained unchanged.
Badger v. _hinney, 15 Mass. 359. But, this being copartnership-property, previous to the agreement, the only remedy of
the complainant was in this court; and this plea of infancy
is not a full defence to the case made by the bill.
In the case of Moley v. Brine, 120 Mass. 324, three persons, one of whom was a minor, were partners, and put into
the business different amounts. It was held that, upon a dissolution of the partnership, the assets, upon a settlement of
its business, being less than the amount contributed by all to
the common stock, should be divided among the partners,
according to the amount of their contributions, and that the
deficiency and loss should be borne by the partners in the same
proportion in which they were to bear profits and losses; in
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other words, that the minority of one of the partners gave
him no advantage in the particulars named. Of him it was
said: "He actually entered into the partnership, had the
benefits of it while it lasted, and drew out the greater part of
his-contribution. The assets remaining at the time of the
dissolution being insufficient to pay the claims of all the partners, the loss of capital must fall upon the three partners in
equal proportions, and the infant cannot throw upon his copartners the obligation of making up the deficiency."
In the case of Furlong v. Bartlett, 21 Pick. 401, one of the
partners made a general assignment in the name of the firm,
of all the partnership property, in trust, for the payment of
the debts of the company, and delivered the property to the
assignee. The other partner, who was a minor, ratified the
assignment, but, on coming of age, brought an action against
the assignee for the alleged unlawful taking and asportation
of the property. It was held that trespass would not lie. In
the decision of the case, it was said: "The court entertains
strong doubts whether, under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, any action will lie, or whether the plaintiff has any
remedy, unless for his share of the balance, if the partnership
should be ultimately solvent ; but of this, as it is not now before the court, they express no opinion."
The case in 120 Mass., supra, is based upon the proposition
that where an infant has enjoyed the benefits of that for which
he paid his money, he cannot recover back the money. In
support of the conclusion reached, the court cited Breed v.
Judd, 1 Gray, 455; Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508; Aldrich
v. Abrahams, Hill & D. 428 ; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110 ;
Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 251. The case of Breed v. Judd
was based, really, upon two propositions: First,that, in order
to rescind a contract, an infant must place the other party in
statu quo ; and, second, that an infant cannot rescind an executed contract where he has enjoyed the benefit of it. The
ground of the judgment in the case of Holmes v. Blogg was
that the infant had received something of value for the money
he has paid, and that he could not put the other party in the
same position as before. For those reasons it was held that
the infant could not recover back the money he had paid on a
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lease. _n Aldrich v. Abrahams it was said: "It has been holden
that by avoiding an executory contract, the infant only cancel5 his obligation to perform it. He does not acquire the
right to recover back what he had paid, or for services which
he had rendered, under the agreement while it remained in
force. In the case of .Medbury v. lVatrous, the court indorsed
the doctrine that where an infant pays money on a contract,
and enjoys the benefit of it, and then avoids it, he cannot recover back the consideration paid; but suggested that if he
has but partially enjoyed the benefits of the contract, he ought
to be allowed to recover the difference. It was announced as
the law, in the case of Heath v. Stevens, that an infant, upon
rescinding an executed contract, may recover for what he has
done or paid under it, provided he restore or account for what
he has received under the contract.
It will be observed that the decision in the Michigan case
above cited, is based upon the proposition that an infant cannot disaffirm a partnership agreement during his minority.
The reasoning in that case was adopted in the Maryland case.
The decision in the case in Paige was based largely upon the
proposition that an infant cannot be permitted to retain the
property purchased by him, and at the same time repudiate
the contract upon which he purchased it. It may be said of
most, if not of all, the propositions upon which the decisions
in the cases cited are based, that they have not been regarded
as the law in this State. We have stated them for the purpose of determining whether or not the conclusions in those
cases may be regarded as correct, notwithstanding the propositions upon which they rest may be regarded as incorrect.
The holdings by this court have been that all avoidable contracts by an infant in relation to personal property may be
disaffirmed by him during minority. Carpenterv. Carpenter,
45 Ind. 142; X'anufacturing Co. v. Wilcox, 59 Id. 429, and
cases there cited ; Ayers v. Burns, 87 Id. 245, and cases there
cited; Bice v. Boyer, 108 Id. 472, and cases there cited, including cases by the Supreme Court of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York. In support of the right of infants to
disaffirm such contracts during minority, see, also, Tyler Lnf.
(2d Ed.) 70, 72, and cases there cited; Schouler Dom. Rel.
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§ 409 ; 1 Lind. Partn. 83. The Supreme Court of Maryland,
since the case above cited from that court, has held that al
infant may thus disaffirm during minority. Adams v. Beall,
Ct. App. Md. March 16, 1887. And so it has been the holding of this court that, in order to disaffirm and maintain an
action during minority for his property or for money paid on
a voidable contract, it is not necessary for the infant to return
what he has received, or to place the other party in statu quo.
Pitcher v. Laycock, 7 Ind. 398, and cases there cited; Miles v.
Lingcrnan, 24 Id. 385; Briggs v. McCabe, 27 Id. 327; Towell
v. Pence, 47 Id. 304; Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra ; White
v. Branch, 51 Ind. 210. The statute of 1881 has changed the
rule as to real estate, but that change is not material here.
Section 2945, Rev. St. 1881. And so, upon ample authority,
this court has repudiated the doctrine that "if an infant advances money on a voidable contract, which he afterwards
rescinds, he cannot recover this money back, because it is lost
to him by his own act; and the privilege of infancy does not
extend so far as to restore this money, unless it was obtained
from him by fraud." House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109, and
cases there cited.
The cases thus reviewed lend aid to the proposition that,
in the case before us, appellant cannot, through the instrumentality of the court exercising equitable powers, and the
receiver appointed by it, have the assets of the firm appropriated in the way of refunding to him what he invested in the
business, and thus leave the firm creditors wholly or partially
unpaid. And, so far as they sustain that proposition, we approve of them, although disapproving, in the main, the reasoning upon which they rest. Had appellant purchased the
goods on his own account, and paid for them, he might have
disaffirmed the contract and recovered the amount paid without first returning, or offering to return,' them to the person
from whom he purchased them. It does not follow from that,
however, that, after having thus disaffirmed the contract, he
could nevertheless hold the goods as against the person from
whom the purchase was made. He would not be allowed to
retain the goods after having thus recovered what he paid for
them. When an infant thus repudiates a contract, he repudi-
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ates it for all purposes. He cannot repudiate it so as to escape
payment for an article purchased, and still hold the article as
against the person from whom the purchase was made. As
was said in the case in Paige, supra, when a contract is thus
repudiated, the vendor may have his action to recover the
goods from the infant, if they remain in his hands unchanged.
And so, if appellant had purchased the goods on his own account, he might have disaffirmed the contract, and refused to
pay for them without returning or offering to return them to
the vendor. But, after having thus disaffirmed the contract,
and refused to pay, he could not hold the goods as against the
vendor. See Kitchen v. Lee, supra; .Bicev. Boyer, 108 Ind.
472. What he could not do otherwise, he certainly cannot
accomplish through a court of equity. Having gone into
court and asked that the assets of the firm should be taken
charge of by it, through a receiver, he must be held to have
consented that the court shall deal with them and the rights
of all concerned, as the law and equity may require. Having
thus invoked the interposition of the court, he must be held
to have consented that it shall close out the business, so as to
settle the ultimate rights of the parties. If it be said that
his disafirmance of the contract is such as would otherwise
have relieved him from the obligation to pay for the goods,
then the court having charge of the goods has the right to
see to it that they, or the money that may be realized from
the sale of them, shall be returned to the vendor.
In our judgment, however, appellant's course has been such
as to ratify the purchase of the goods, and all that has been
done by the firm. He states in his bill that he "renounces
the partnership arrangement, and asks to avoid and annul all
of his obligations in that behalf;" but, at the same time, he
treats the goods and assets on hand as partnership assets, and
asks the court to take charge of and deal with them as such.
His disaflirmance puts an end to the contract by which he
became a member of the firm; but by asking the court to
take charge of the goods as assets of the firm, as to them, he
not only does not disaffirm, but ratifies all that was done in the
purchase of them. As to them, he cannot disaffirm, and, at
the same time treat them as partnership assets. Having
VoL. XXXVI.-68
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treated them as assets of the firm by asking the court to deal
with them as such, the court will deal with them as partnership assets, as in any other case, and apply them first to the
payment of the debts of the firm. 2 Lindl. Partn. *1040.
This is not an action against the other party to recover a personal judgment against him for the amount paid into the
business by appellant. What might be the rights of the parties in such an action, we do not decide. It is sufficient here
that, in our judgment, the conclusions of law by the court
below upon the facts found were correct, and the proper decree was entered.
dgment affirmed, with costs.
The general subject of the rights
and liabilities of infants as partners
is well considered in the 5th edition
of Lindley on Partnership, thus :"An infant may be a partner.
But, speaking generally, whilst he is
an infant, he incurs no liability and
is not responsible for the debts of the
firm; and when he comes of age, or
even before, he may, if he chooses,
disaffirm past transactions.
"The irresponsibility of an infant
for the debts of a partnership of
which he is a member, is an obvious
consequence of his general incapacity
to bind himself by contract, and does
not require to be supported by any
special authority. It might, perhaps,
be thought that an infant who held
himself out as a partner would be
liable to persons trusting to his representations if they did not know
him to be under age; but this is not
so; and as an infant is not responsible for the torts of his agent, an
infant partneir cannot be held liable
for the misconduct of his copartners.
The irresponsibility of an infant as a
partner seems therefore to be complete, except in cases of fraud.
"But an infant who was guilty of
fraud was not so free from liability
in equity, as he was at law; and

equitable as distinguished from legal
relief, e. g., rescission of contract,
may be obtained against him. In
accordance with these principles,
although, as a rule, an infant cannot
be made bankrupt, yet if he fraudulently represents himself as of age,
and obtains credit by his false representations, and is made bankrupt,
the adjudication against him will not
be superseded, and his deceived
creditors will be paid out of his
estate.
"Moreover, notwithstanding the
general irresponsibility of an infant,
he cannot, as against his copartners,
insist that in taking the partnership
accounts he shall be credited with
profits, and not be debited with losses.
The infant partner must either repudiate or abide by the agreement
under which alone he is entitled to
any share of the profits.
"An infant partner may avoid the
contract into which he has entered,
either before or within a reasonable
time after he has come of age. If he
avoids the contract, and has derived
no benefit from it, he is entitled to
recover back any money paid by him
in part performance of it ; but he cannot do this if he has already obtained
advantages under the contract, and
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cannot restore the party contracting
with him to the same position as if
no contract had been entered into.
" If, when an infant partner comes
of -ge, he is desirous of retiring from
the firm, he should express his determination speedily and unequivocally. It is true that by the Infants'
Relief Act, 1874, promises made by a
person who has attained twenty-one,
to pay debts contracted before that
age, cannot be enforced; but a person who retains a share in a partnership cannot retain it without its
incidental obligations; and the doctrine of holding out is itself sufficient
to impose liability upon an adult,
although he may not long have attained his majority. This is well
exemplified in Goode v. Harrison(5
B. & A. 147). There an infant was
a member of a firm, and he was
known to be a member. After he
had attained twenty-one he did not
expressly either affirm or disaffirm
the partnership. He was held liable
for debts incurred by his copartners
subsequently to that time. A person
who, before he comes of age, represents himself as a partner, must,
when he comes of age, take care to
notify that he has ceased to be a
partner if he desires to avoid liability."
For the convenience of the practitioner we present a digest of the
principal American cases upon the
general subject of infant partners:An infant may be a partner, and
his father, though indebted and insolvent, may release to his son all
claim to his services; and the consent of the father to the son's becoming a partner is a release of his
services : Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt.
503.
An infant's partnership agreement
is not void, but voidable only: Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182; Osburn v.
Firr,42 Id. 134. See, also, Whitney

v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457 ; s. c. Ewell's
Lead. Cas. 38; McGunn v. Hanlin,
29 Mich. 476.
In an action upon a contract for
goods sold and delivered to a partnership, one member ofwhich is a minor,
the plea of infancy may be interposed
by him in bar of personal liability
upon such contract: Folds v. Allardt,
35 Minn. 488.
As to the plea of non estfactum and
infancy in an action upon a promissory note against an alleged firm,
see King v. Barbour, 70 Ind. 35.
Although an infant may become a
partner, he cannot be held individually for the contracts of the firm,
unless he ratifies them after majority:
Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 344.
An infant may rescind his agreement of partnership and recover back
his investment therein, less the
amount received from the firm: Sparman v. Keim, 83 N. Y. 245; s. c.
9 Abb. N. C. 1; reversing 44 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 163. See, however, Page
v. Morse, 128 Mass. 99; Adans v.
Beall, 10 East Rep. 771.
As to when an infant may avoid
his voidable acts, see, generally,
Ewell's Leading Cases on Inf. & Coy.
92, 96, and cases cited.
To the point that an infant's ratification or avoidance must be in tote, if
at all, see Ewell's Lead. Cases, 124,
161, 164, and cases cited.
As to what amounts to a ratification
of a partnership by an infant, see
Ewell's Lead. Cases, 169, 170, 175.
A minor entered into partnership in
Sussex County with two others, and
putin $1000. Before he came of age,
the partnership was dissolved, the
minor receiving his $1000. After the
dissolution he removed to Huntington
County, and A. recovered a judgment
against the members of the firm, including the minor, without his knowA. transferred the judgment
ledge.
to B. Three years afterwards B.
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brought an action on the j udgment,
and recovered a second judgment, no
process being served on thhe minor.
B. caused an execution to be issued
to the sheriff of Huntingtonn County,
and to be levied on the property of
the minor there. The minor filed a bill
stating the foregoing facts, charging
fraud, etc., and obtained ani njunction
to stay proceedings on the e xecution :
Vansyckle v. Rorback, 6 N. J.. Eq. 234.
While an infant is a pa.rtner,his
acts within the scope of the firm
business will bind the firm Avery v.
TYher, 28 Hun, 508 (an assi gnment);
Bush v. Linticum, 59 Md. 3,19.
A person against whom, with his
partner, proceedings in kasolvenoy
have been instituted, caninot avoid
them on the ground that hIis partner
was an infant when the p' ooeedings
were begun, if the infant was then
represented by a guardian ad litem,
and has ratified the proceedings after
arriving at age: Windater r. Thayer,
129 Mass. 129.
Where a person engage in business as copartner with another, and
ostensibly competent to co nduct it,
incurs in form the usual liability
appertaining to it, and esc apes such
liability by pleading infa cy, it is
not a just exercise of dis cretion to
allow him to recover costs after haying enjoyed the advantag e of the
purchase of property by the firm:
Yamato Trading Co. v. E loexter, 44
Hun (N. Y.), 491.
Where a father invests his own
funds and personal servic es, or the
funds of his children in his hands as
guardian arising from an unauthorized sale of their property, in a partnership for their benefit, and the
children afterwards seek to enforce
the partnership in equity, the other
partner cannot avail himse If of these
facts to avoid the contract Stein v.
Robertson, 30 Ala. 286.
Where one, being a wridow and

natural tutrix of her minor children,
and having the posession and administration of the property of her deceased husband's succession during
her life, entered Into a partnership
with the heirs, who were of fall age,
and slaves and other property of the
succession were employed and used
by the partnership, held, that the
minor heirs were not, and could not
be made by their natural tutrix,
members of the partnership; and
that they, consequently, after her
death, had the right to sue for and
recover from the surviving partners a
debt due them by the partnership
before a settlement and liquidation
of partnership affairs: Cuillg v. Gassen, 14 La. Ann. 5.
To the point that the false and
fraudulent declaration of an infant
that he is of fall age, made at the
time of entering into a contract, does
not prevent him from avoiding the
contract at his election, see Burley v.
Russell, 10 N. H. 184; Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Ca. 127; Ferguson v.
Bobo, 54 Miss. 121 ; Merriam v. Cunnnghlam, 11 Cush. 40; Norris v.
Vance, 3 Rich. 164; Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142; Curtin v.
Patton, 11 S. & R. 309 ; Stoolfoos v.
Jenkins, 12 Id. 403; Brown v. McCune,
5 Sandf. 224; Ewell's Lead. Cas. 219.
Where the principal defendant in
garnishment proceedings is a firm, a
verdict discharging one of the partners because he is an Infant does not
release the garnishee: Bethel v.
Chipman, 57 Mich. 379.
It seems that where two persons
have held themselves out as partners,
one of them being of full age, cannot
be heard to allege, as against the
firm creditors, that a contract of partnership was voidable because the
other was a minor: David v. Birchard,
33 Wis. 492.
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